An evolutionary approach to anomalous intuition

Intuition has always been associated with a hint of the anomalous, with credible examples of intuitive knowledge that appear to arise from the future or from distant locations without sensory mediation. Experimental and anecdotal evidence exists to suggest that a complete understanding of intuition will need to include these anomalous aspects of intuition. To that end it is important to recognize that an understanding of anomalous intuition, though presenting considerable challenges to physics and neuroscience, may not require ‘paranormal’ explanations or entities outside the compass of science. Anomalous intuition has traditionally been studied within the field of parapsychology where is it known as extrasensory perception (ESP). One model of ESP proposes two stages. In the first stage, the process, the anomalous information is ‘received’ and in the second stage, the product, the anomalous information is elaborated into conscious awareness and/or behaviour. The process is a challenge primarily for physics, and physicists both within parapsychology and in the mainstream are addressing it. The product, anomalous intuition, is grounded in normal psychological activity and is a problem for psychology and neuroscience to understand. In order to understand how ESP or anomalous intuition works, it is necessary to understand its purpose within an evolutionary context. Evolution has proven exceptionally effective in enabling species to make use of a wide range of physical phenomena for information gathering and communication. If some yet undiscovered physical process permits retrocausation would we not expect evolution to have capitalized on that process. As a product of evolution, ESP would have to conform to the requirements of evolutionary theory. Suddendorf and Corballis (2007) have elaborated the notion of mental time travel (MTT), the memory-based ability to project oneself into the past as well as the future, and have argued that the “ultimate evolutionary advantage” may lie in the capacity to envisage future events. Their model of MTT provides an ideal context in which to understand an evolutionary path for anomalous intuition. Working through the emotional system, anomalous intuition may operate by influencing the selection of memory images we use to execute our MTT. A growing body of data supports the involvement of the emotional system in anomalous intuition but there is only suggestive evidence for the expected hereditary component. The observed limited effectiveness of anomalous intuition may emerge from the balance achieved through an evolutionarily stable strategy, or result from inherent limitations in capitalizing on the underlying physical proces

Topological and Hq Equivalence of Prime Cyclic p-gonal Actions on Riemann Surfaces

Two Riemann surfaces S1 and S2 with conformal G-actions have topologically equivalent actions if there is a homeomorphism h : S1 -\u3e S2 which intertwines the actions. A weaker equivalence may be defined by comparing the representations of G on the spaces of holomorphic q-differentials Hq(S1) and Hq(S2). In this note we study the differences between topological equivalence and Hq equivalence of prime cyclic actions, where S1/G and S2/G have genus zero

Quasi-Platonic PSL(2,q)-Actions on Closed Riemann Surfaces

This paper is the first of two papers whose combined goal is to explore the dessins d\u27enfant and symmetries of quasi-platonic actions of PSL2(q). A quasi-platonic action of a group G on a closed Riemann S surface is a conformal action for which S/G is a sphere and S-\u3eS/G is branched over {0, 1,infinity}. The unit interval in S/G may be lifted to a dessin d\u27enfant D, an embedded bipartite graph in S. The dessin forms the edges and vertices of a tiling on S by dihedrally symmetric polygons, generalizing the idea of a platonic solid. Each automorphism p in the absolute Galois group determines a transform Sp by transforming the coefficients of the defining equations of S. The transform defines a possibly new quasi-platonic action and a transformed dessin Dp. Here, in this paper, we describe the quasi-platonic actions of PSL2(q) and the action of the absolute Galois group on PSL2(q) actions. The second paper discusses the quasi-platonic actions constructed from symmetries (reflections) and the resulting triangular tiling that refines the dessin d\u27enfant. In particular, the number of ovals and the separation properties of the mirrors of a symmetry are determined

W. S. Broughton to Mr. Meredith (3 October 1962)

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/mercorr_pro/1201/thumbnail.jp

Golf Brain: A Neuropsychological Study of Performance in Competition

Golf, as a sport, has been described by its masters as a mental game first and a technical skill second. Many players logged countless practice hours only to find suboptimal performance in tournaments; when it matters the most. I investigated the relationship between executive functioning specific to decision-making under anxious arousal and golfers’ performance under anxious arousal. I used a repeated measures design including variety of executive functioning tests to examine participants’ abilities. Participants were recruited from western Oregon including collegiate golfers and university students, and were grouped into non-golfers and golfer groups based on whether they played golf and self-reported a consistent ability to score below 80 on a golf course. A golf performance putting task that mimics tournament pressure, “Tornado task,” was the initial task. Heartrate and skin conductance data were gathered during the Tornado task and executive functioning tasks. Results showed differences between golfer and non-golfers in their physiological arousal during risk-reward decisions. The IGT-2, Color-Word, and Tower Test executive functioning measures yielded similar arousal levels between groups. Self-reported anxiety on performance did not equate with greater physiological arousal during executive functioning tasks. RMSSD appears to be a more accurate measure of physiological arousal under pressure than EDA. It is likely that golfers have more training in managing sympathetic arousal in competition, are more accustomed to risk reward situations, and take greater risks in the presence of physiological arousal. I found golfers experience less anxious arousal while taking executive functioning tasks, and take more risks in decision-making decisions yet do not outperform non-golfers. Golfers were able to manage their nervous system arousal more effectively than non-golfers